Abstract. This paper offers a historical micro-level analysis of the impact of climatic shocks on the incidence of conflict in colonial Nigeria (1912Nigeria ( -1945. Primary historical sources on court cases, prisoners and homicides are used to construct an index of socio-political conflict using principal component analysis and measure climatic shocks through deviations from long-term rainfall patterns in a nonlinear (U-shaped) relation, capturing both drought and excessive rainfall. We find a robust and significant relationship between rainfall deviations and conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agroecological zones that are least resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah) and where (pre-) colonial political structures were less centralized. We find tentative evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops (such as cocoa and palm oil) compared to subsistence farming areas, suggesting that agricultural diversification acts as an insurance mechanism against the whims of nature. Additional historical information on food shortages, crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence is used to explore the climate-conflict connection in greater detail.
Introduction "With few stocks in hand, one year's shortfall could easily be translated into a famine"
-Megan Vaughan (2007: 5) literature, which seeks to investigate whether climate-induced scarcities lead to conflict; 3 and the economic historical literature, which assesses the welfare effects of different colonial institutional arrangements and modes of economic specialization (such as the cash-crop revolution). The environmental security literature has not reached consensus on the linkage between climate and conflict. Hsiang et al. (2013) claim that climate change may be partly responsible for occasional outbreaks of violence, and, more generally, greater economic and political instability (see also (Burke et al., 2009; Koubi et al., 2012) . Previous studies have blamed climatic variability for increasing the likelihood of civil wars (Burke et al., 2009; Miguel et al., 2004) , or even for directly causing them (Davis, 2010; Faris, 2009 ). These findings have been criticized by other researchers, who have pointed to weaknesses in the construction of the climatological variables (Ciccone, 2011) , and the level of aggregation of the conflict variables used (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Klomp & Bulte, 2012) . In line with Fjelde and von Uexkull (2012) , this paper will not argue that climatic shocks lead to widespread civil conflict, but rather that the enhanced competition over scarce resources leads to disputes and clashes on a smaller intercommunal scale. In spite of their calamitous impact on civilian life and property, non-state intercommunal conflicts have received limited attention in the literature. 4 The economic historical literature largely agrees that African economies have expanded, to varying degrees, in response to increasing colonial trade and agricultural commercialization, but it remains unclear as to the extent to which ordinary Africans have benefitted from such developments (Bowden et al., 2008; Fieldhouse, 1999; Frankema & Waijenburg, 2012; Moradi, 2009; Rodney, 1978) .
This debate has led to two rather opposing views. The "neo-Marxists" or "dependency theorists" hold that the introduction of new cash crops (such as cocoa) or the expansion of existing cash crops (including palm oil, rubber, coffee and cotton) in Africa has destroyed farmers' traditional insurance mechanisms by inhibiting food production, without replacing them with any new form of security (Vaughan, 2007; Watts, 1983) . The alternative view maintains that crop commercialization has provided the means to increase farmers' incomes through the increased benefits reaped from international and inter-regional trade. This diversified farmers' production and therefore limited the vulnerability of cash-crop farmers to the vagaries of climate (Berry, 1975; Galletti et al., 1956) . Therefore, this paper uses closely documented historical sources to answer the underlying question stemming from the aforementioned debate: "Were the cash-crop provinces more -or less -susceptible to climate-induced conflict? Did the introduction of cash crops benefit the local societies, or did it make them more vulnerable to erratic weather fluctuations?"
Colonial Nigeria offers an interesting case for several reasons. As West Africa's largest and most populous nation, it contains within its borders a wide range of geographical (such as agro-ecological 3 Henceforth, the term "conflict" will be used in its broadest definition in order to encompass a wide range of violent incidents, such as land disputes between resource users (individuals and/or groups); violent and non-violent actions to evict certain resource users; theft; raiding of livestock; beatings; killing of humans or livestock; large-scale destruction of villages; and general armed violence. 4 Statistics relating to intercommunal conflicts over scarce resources in recent post-colonial Nigeria reveal their importance, severity and frequency: these resource conflicts claimed more than 7000 lives between 1991 and 2006 (Fjelde, 2009; Sundberg et al., 2012) and have been responsible for over 51 percent of all clashes in the whole country for the same time period (Fasona & Omojola, 2005) .
zones) and institutional (such as political entities) features; consequently, meaningful comparisons can be derived. Additionally, the timeframe of this study guarantees a rather uniform institutional framework under British colonial rule; 1912 marked the end of effective resistance to British rule and the establishment of the borders of the Nigerian colonial state, while 1945 saw the start of serious internal resistance to colonial policies before the independence movement gained any real power. The Nigerian
Colonial Annual Reports provide substantial information on both the background and frequency of conflict, as well as on climate-related data, which allowed us to create balanced panel data of all the administrative provinces in colonial Nigeria. 5 These sources also made it possible to isolate instances of conflict caused by resistance against colonial rule from those related to climatic shocks.
Overall, the results suggest a strong relationship between rainfall deviations and conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah) and where (pre-) colonial political structures were less centralized. We also find tentative evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops. This is a topic of considerable urgency today as the process of global climate change accelerates, generating more severe and unpredictable weather events, as well as more erratic rainfall patterns.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical environmental security literature, and discusses the Nigerian colonial context in terms of geographical characteristics, political structures and economic activity. Section 3 describes the baseline model, the data and the estimation methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical results of the various measures. Section 5 provides detailed evidence from a number of historical cases in colonial Nigeria, and identifies the mechanisms through which climate-induced scarcities led to conflict. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Climate shocks and conflict in colonial Nigeria

Theory
The primary theoretical relationship between climate shocks and conflict runs via the increased scarcity of vital resources such as food and fresh water. A harvest failure leading to food shortages, or unexpected declines in freshwater supplies intensifies the competition over access to water and land, and increases the possibility of conflict (Baechler, 1999; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Tietenberg & Lewis, 2000) . The principal criticism of this simple theoretical argument is that it neglects socio-political and economic contextual factors that play a role in mediating or aggravating the effects of climate-induced scarcities (Barnett, 2003; Dalby, 2002; Gleditsch, 1998; Hagmann, 2005) . This criticism has led to the development of more 5 The sources used are the annual reports filed by the colonial administration. These reports were filed by political departments, and give information and explanations on all incidences of resistance and conflict considered worthy of mention, along with their likely causes. This information will be supplemented and supported by the reports of the police, prisons and military departments. Clearly, a serious weakness is that these reports present only one side of the story (that of the colonizers). However, African accounts are unfortunately scarce. Therefore, when possible, secondary accounts and research by later Nigerian academics are used to corroborate the primary sources. In addition, the reports are reliable enough to provide clear general patterns that differentiate the regions chosen in terms of how often (armed) conflict broke out during the period studied.
specific, context-dependent, theoretical mechanisms to explain the causal pathways between climate, demography, environment and conflict (Homer-Dixon, 2010; Kahl, 2006) .
The literature covers different time horizons. Studies of long-term climate change look mainly into the causes of desertification of previously arable lands (Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Homer-Dixon, 1999) . Studies analyzing the short-term effects climatic shocks 6 look into the effects of an extreme deviation from an expected historical mean, which can lead to an immediate scarcity of water or food (Dercon, 2004; Dercon & Krishnan, 2000; Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012) . However, in both time horizons the outcome can be the same; that is, increasing competition over scarce resources, which may yield a higher incidence of violence and disorder if political institutions fail to mitigate distributional conflicts.
Even though a large volume of recently published studies aim to link climate-induced scarcities to different incidents of conflict, there is no consensus yet on precisely how these mechanisms operate (Buhaug, 2010; Ciccone, 2011; Klomp & Bulte, 2012) . The problem is that most of the research so far has focused on large-scale conflict, such as civil wars (Buhaug & Lujala, 2005; Burke et al., 2009; Hendrix & Glaser, 2007; Miguel et al., 2004; Ross, 2004) . The use of civil war as the dependent variable has been severely criticized on both methodological grounds (Ciccone, 2011) and those of the proposed causal mechanisms (Buhaug, 2010; Gleditsch, 1998) . Kahl (2006) and Homer-Dixon (2010) have pointed out that demographic and environmental pressures are more prone to cause inter-communal mini-scale conflict than to cause widespread civil conflict. Recent research has been gradually moving away from larger cross-national conflict studies to use more disaggregated sub-national measures of conflict (Adano et al., 2012; Fjelde, 2009; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012; Theisen, 2012) . In addition, these studies pay more attention to qualitative evidence in order to contextualize their empirical findings (Benjaminsen et al., 2012; Blakeslee & Fishman, 2013) , and provide a more subtle argument about the role of climate shocks in outbreaks of (inter-communal) conflict (Hsiang et al., 2013) . The present study can be seen as a contribution to these tendencies.
Contextual conditions
In thinking about the possible mechanisms underpinning the climate-conflict nexus in colonial Nigeria, it is important to consider some of the underlying agro-ecological, economic and political conditions. The first condition is that the great majority of the Nigerian population during colonial times relied on rain-fed agriculture. This implies that rainfall shocks had a potentially dramatic and direct impact on food security.
In terms of historical barriers to the internal transport of imported foodstuffs, this potential impact was almost certainly larger than it is today (Nigeria became a major net food importer during the second half of the 20th century, but was largely self-sufficient until the 1960s). This is why we use rainfall variability to explore climate shocks on a subnational level (Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012; Raleigh & Kniveton, 2012; Theisen, 2012) .
The prime hypothesis is that both droughts and excessive rainfall have reduced the productivity of arable land and that, in addition, droughts have reduced the availability of fresh water. The 6 Climate change denotes a long-term lasting change of weather patterns over periods ranging from decades to hundreds of years, whereas a climatic shock denotes a rapid, annual and short-term extreme deviation from an expected annual observation.
hypothetical relationship thus takes a U-shaped form, as illustrated in Figure 1 , and will be estimated accordingly (see Section 3). Deviations from the long-term rainfall mean are thought to have increased the probability of violent clashes between or within communities over increasingly scarce resources (Fasona & Omojola, 2005; Hussein et al., 1999; Turner, 2004) .
Figure 1. Standardized rainfall deviation and conflict events
The suggested climate-conflict relationship depends on many contextual factors. Although
Nigeria lies entirely within the tropics, it covers different tropical agro-ecological zones, characterized by different rainfall patterns (see Map 1). Since temperatures fluctuate much less in tropical than in temperate climate zones, seasonal cultivation strategies and crop-specific harvests tend to depend primarily based on rainfall (Iloeje, 2001; Kowal & Kassam, 1978) . Subsistence farmers, commercial farmers and pastoralists have come to specialize in different cropping systems in different agro-ecological zones; all of these variations have contributed to variegated conditions in terms of how people cope with climate-shock-induced scarcities. For instance, livestock breeding broadens the opportunities to store wealth, mediate risks and increase land productivity (Frankema, 2013) . However, the presence of the tsetse fly has constrained cattle-keeping to only few parts of Nigeria (Alsan, 2012) .
In the northern part of Nigeria, which is the Sudan-Sahel savannah, groundnuts were the principal colonial export crop, especially in the heavily populated provinces of Kano, Zaria and Sokoto.
Groundnuts were combined with millet and guinea corn for human and animal consumption. To the south of the Sudanese savannah, the Guinean savannah, food production was dominated by cereals, roots and tubers, along with a wide range of complementary food crops. In "normal" years, this area produced a surplus of cassava, yam, guinea corn and millet, which were traded to other regions of Nigeria. Fasona and Omojola (2005) labeled the Guinean savannah as the "food basket of the nation", 7 and argued that it is the most conflict-prone zone in Nigeria. Turner (2004) argued that the combination of highly vulnerable production systems in northern Nigeria, with a surplus area next door, increases the probability of widespread inter-communal conflict in cases of climate-induced scarcities in the North. The southern part of Nigeria stretches across the rainforest belt and the freshwater swamp zone. In this area, cash crops such as cocoa, palm oil, and tubers dominated agricultural production.
Map 1. Agro-ecological zones in Nigeria
Source: Iloeje & FAO 2001 , created in ArcGIS.
In political terms, colonial Nigeria can be divided into three different areas that correspond with the British administrative divisions of the country (see map A-1, Appendix). The northern and western regions had established traditions of centralized power capable of exerting military influence and demanding allegiance and tribute from surrounding territories. The Muslim-dominated North was controlled by the long-established emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate, and was the largest region in terms of both area and population. Empire-building had been a feature of the region half a millennia before the arrival of Europeans (Iliffe, 1995) and was conditioned, amongst other things, by the absence of the tsetse fly, which allowed states to harness the potential of cavalry to carry their armies further and faster compared to their counterparts in the South (Reid, 2012) .
The South can be roughly divided into two sections. In the West, a number of Yoruba kingdoms and the kingdom of Benin exercised changing degrees of central power. Although this region lacked political unity, states with sophisticated economic, political and cultural identities had already been developed since the 15th century (Iliffe, 1995) . Their wealth was principally based on trade and tributes from subordinate territories (Eltis, 2000) . On the contrary, in the East, political authority rarely extended 7 The colonial officials named these regions the "Market Garden of Nigeria" (CO657/38: 72), because vast quantities of foodstuffs were exported to both the northern and southern provinces.
beyond the village level. The dominant group was the Igbo (referred to as Ibo by the British). This region was characterized, on the one hand, by some of the densest rural populations in sub-Saharan Africa and, on the other, by a lack of large centralized political units (Ohadike, 1991) . The most significant problem that the British faced here was how to govern a territory that had no existing state apparatus by which they could induce local leaders to rule on their behalf. The colonial solution was the disastrous "Warrant
Chief" system (Afigbo, 1972) . 8 The political structure of colonial Nigeria can thus be roughly summarized as a highly centralized structure in the North, compared to a semi-centralized south-western area and a completely amorphous south-eastern area. From 1912 until 1920 there were a number of provincial reorganizations that set the boundaries, but this greater division remained until independence.
These differentiated structures are essential to understand why areas reacted differently to the encroachment of colonial rule. Especially in areas with weak pre-colonial states, centralization resistance was endemic (Falola, 2009) . It may thus be expected that the East and areas of the North outside the Emirates were more prone to conflict per se, even if these conflicts were unrelated to climate shocks.
Moreover, in the centralized state structures of the North, which were characterized by higher social cohesion (higher local accountability) and stronger political institutions (state legitimacy and capacity), the British applied a stricter version of indirect rule, in which the Islamic territories were granted a greater deal of autonomy.
Finally, there is empirical evidence that sees more politically centralized entities to be more coherent and less violent (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013) . The econometric results of this paper show that in areas where the institutional arrangements were weak and did not extend beyond the village level, the competition over land and water was more severe, and led to higher levels of inter-communal conflict. Whereas in areas where there was a central power capable of exerting its influence to other surrounding territories, climatic shocks did not give rise to as many instances of conflict.
Plausible mechanisms
In discussing the plausible mechanisms that link climate shocks to conflict in colonial Nigeria, it is important to emphasize that extreme rainfall shocks may work in both directions, either through negative rainfall deviations leading to drought, potential crop failures and freshwater shortages, or through positive rainfall deviations, which can damage crops through flooding, mudslides or waterborne crop diseases.
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In a severe drought scenario, farmers and pastoralists may get into conflict over access to fresh water (Gleick, 1993) . Rainfall shortages can have a direct effect on the number of farm animals, as a result of starvation (humans consume fodder) or dying of thirst (Fafchamps et al., 1998) . Besides being a source of meat and milk, livestock is also indispensable for crop cultivation (for instance, ploughing, harrowing). A sharp decline in farm animals can thus have a detrimental effect on non-animal food supplies as well (Fafchamps et al., 1998; Jahnke & Jahnke, 1982) . However, in addition, excessive rainfall may increase stress among different type of farmers. If floods, mudslides or waterborne diseases destroy harvests, they can also destroy part of the food stock for farm animals.
Another mechanism through which both types of rainfall shocks may lead to conflict is through increasing the market price of food. Food-price spikes can make food inaccessible (Glantz, 1988) , and even the mere expectation of (climate-induced) crop failures can drive up prices. There is ample historical evidence of speculators (hoarders) who, in advance of an expected price spike, withheld their cereals from the markets in order to sell at higher prices in preindustrial Europe (Post, 1984) , where centralized states were often taking action against these practices in order to prevent social disorder. There is evidence of hoarders in colonial Africa behaving in similar ways during years of widespread food security concerns (Devereux & Berge, 2000; Vaughan, 2007; Watts, 1983) .
Market prices of foodstuffs in Nigeria were subject to seasonal fluctuations and could be doubled or halved within a year if one of the seasons failed to deliver (CO657/40). Figure 2 illustrates how millet prices in Kano (northern Nigeria) were concurrent with climatic-shock-related harvest conditions.
Environmental security theory suggests that when societies face food shortages, price disputes emerge between rural producers and urban consumers that increase pressure on both sectors. The rising price of staple crops creates greater price inflation that undermines the purchasing power of urban dwellers (Berry, 1975; Hill, 1977; Shenton & Watts, 1979 A third mechanism that can instigate or aggravate conflict is the migration of people out of affected areas towards lesser-affected areas. Increasing demographic pressure intensifies the competition over food, water or land. Particularly in countries with sharp ethnic or religious divisions, migration into "hostile," territory can easily create inter-communal tensions (Reuveny, 2007) . For example, during the severe drought spells of 1928 in the Sudanese Sahel, people from the North were forced to move southward, in the hope of finding uncultivated land and more favorable climatic conditions (Watts, 1983 Watts (1983) , pointed out that the capitalist development (and, in particular, crop commercialization) in Nigeria created an unprecedented vulnerability to famines.
Through a closely documented analysis of the peasant society for both the pre-colonial and colonial
Hausaland, Watts portrayed the pre-colonial African subsistence economy as self-sufficient, autonomous and cooperative. In this "moral economy", 10 mechanisms and social systems were developed to insure 10 For a detailed description of the concept see (Thompson, 1971) . Additionally, see (Scott, 1977) and Hydén (1980) , who used the term "economy of affection" to describe similar pre-capitalist communal structures. 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 pence per pound
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Climatic Shocks Millet Prices local peasants against possible food disasters by having a "set price" for essential foodstuffs in the market. This price-setting implied that it was more important to a community to have a traditional "fair" price rather than a "free" market, where surpluses could be sold at a higher price. Raynaut (1977) stressed how the social aspects of African farmers were profoundly disrupted by colonial rule, as it changed longestablished methods of distribution and circulation of vital foodstuffs among communities. These methods were well respected within coherent collective groupings (families, ethnic and political units),
and were in line with the socially established norms. According to Raynaut (1977) , the introduction of cash crops limited the capacity of the African subsistence economies to withstand climate-induced food shortages.
On the other side of the debate, scholars have argued that crop commercialization provided the means not only to increase agricultural output, but also to increase farmers' incomes, thereby limiting the vulnerability of cash-crop farmers to the vagaries of climate. For example, Güsten (1968) argued that cash-crop areas could support both their rural and urban populations, since most cash-crop farmers, especially cocoa farmers, did not abandon food crops when extending their cash-crop plantations (see Map 2). In the same vein, Galletti et al. (1956) provided evidence from 187 families located around the cocoa belt in Southern Nigeria, which showed that 175 of them (almost 93 percent) produced some kind of food crop for consumption on the side, such as yams, maize and cassava (1956: 410-411) . Berry (1975: 170-171) stated that "..
.the fact that the cocoa belt as a whole imports food-stuffs need not imply that cocoa has supplanted food crop production in these areas; it may instead reflect increased consumption,
owing to growing population or to higher incomes, or both." She based her argument on the potential increasing benefits reaped from (inter-regional) trade, and on the diversification of domestic production, to conclude that economic specialization (that is, crop commercialization) limited the vulnerability of the cash-crop areas.
Among colonial officers in the early years there existed a widespread consensus that tropical cash crops provided African farmers with a higher and more stable source of income compared to food crops (CO657/40). However, as colonial rule developed, the annual reports show that this consensus began to break down. The director of the 1930 agricultural report expressed considerable concerns regarding the cocoa farmers in southern Nigeria, who, according to him, were "...taking up cocoa and … considerably reducing their output of food crops" (CO657/27). These concerns grew stronger as the crisis of the 1930s wore on. Eventually, the collapse of world market prices for tropical commodities led the colonial government to adopt the Ten Year Development Plan in Nigeria, which contained a deliberate investment plan for strengthening food security and increasing the productivity of the agricultural sector. 
Data and method
In order to estimate the regression model, we use the system-generalized method of moments (system-GMM) developed by Bond et al. (2001) , because it takes into account the time-series dimension of the data, the non-observable province-specific effects, a lagged dependent variable among the explanatory variables, and the possibility that all explanatory variables are endogenous (Roodman, 2006; Vieira et al., 2012) . 12 The functional form of the dynamic panel model can be summarized as follows:
Conflict_variable i,t = γ Conflict_variable t-1 + β 1 rain_dev it + β 2 rain_dev_SQ it + δZˊi t + ν i + μ t +λX i t + ε it i = 1,...,20 and t = 1,…,34
where Conflict_variable i,t denotes the four different conflict variables in province i and year t. β 1 and β 2 are the coefficients of interest to be estimated. Zˊi t is a vector of geographical, institutional and economic determinants of conflict -which need to be controlled for -measured during this period. Province fixed effects (ν i ) control for all time-invariant differences between provinces, and year fixed effects (μ t ) control for factors that may affect levels of conflict across all provinces in the same year; a good example of when higher incidences of conflict might be expected in a given year may be during the World War years, or years with extremely low export prices during the Great Depression. Moreover, X i t denotes a provincespecific time trend; that is, an interaction term between observable province characteristics (ν i ) and a linear time trend (t). In this way, we control for the possibility that (a) colonial authorities have become more efficient in inhibiting conflict over time, and (b) previous conflicts have promoted distrust among certain social groups, in such a way that this distrust may affect future attitudes and conflict intensity between particular groups. ε it is the error term. To address the autocorrelation concerns relating to climatic shocks, the standard errors are clustered at various levels: the province level, the year level, and both the province and the year level (two-way clustered).
The effect of climatic shocks are estimated on four continuous dependent variables: the number of prisoners admitted during the year, 13 the number of court cases, 14 the number of homicides, and a newly constructed index named socio-political conflict (SPC), which combines the former three variables using principal component analysis (PCA). 15 All of the dependent variables are standardized using provincial population estimates. The data was collected from the colonial bluebooks of statistics, administration reports and sessional papers. The rainfall deviation variable is constructed using the following formula: (X i,t -Ẍ i ) / σ i , where Ẍ i is the long-term mean of each panel, X i,t is the annual rainfall in time t for province i, and σ i is the standard deviation of each panel, that is for every i. The rainfall deviation variable ranges from -3.46 to 3.68, and has a mean of almost zero and a standard deviation of 1. The advantage of the standardization of the variable is that it accounts for cross-provincial differences, as well as for within-province variation.
Many studies have found a relationship between low (pre-) colonial centralization and various forms of resistance, hostility, agitation and political protest (Englebert, 2000; Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Huillery, 2011) . We use a categorical variable [political_structures] to capture the variation across provinces, and expect a negative result. Easterly and Levine (1997) considered differences in ethnic fragmentation as a substantial explanation for divergences in political instability and conflict. We include a categorical variable of ethnic homogeneity [ethnic_homogeneity] to control for regional differences in ethnic composition. 21 We also control for the imposition of direct taxation [direct_taxation] in 1929, which has spurred anti-colonial sentiments in various places (Ekundare, 1973; Falola, 2009 ). Finally, we control for the number of police staff [police_staff] , which varied over time, as we expect that more police officers would have been assigned to politically instable provinces (Killingray, 1986) , and that part of their presence was related to tax collection (Clayton & Killingray, 1989) .
(b) Geographical controls
We expect access (distance) to the sea [coastal_distance] 23 to mitigate the impact of climate shocks by offering cheaper access to international trade (Gallup et al., 1999) . Imports can mediate temporary shortages, and thus reduce conflict risks. In the same vain, we include a navigable river dummy [river], and expect a negative result in this regard. Finally, we include a categorical variable, [agroecological_zones] , which ranges from 1-5, in order to control for differences in the resilience of agroecological zones to climatic shocks (Fenske & Kala, 2012; Kala et al., 2012; Seo et al., 2008) .
(c) Economic controls
We expect that the construction of railways would reduce the potential magnitude of famines by opening up areas to food trades (Burgess & Donaldson, 2010) . While some scholars have argued that railway construction related merely to the exportation of goods (Rodney, 1978) , and may have been responsible for the 1913 famine in Kano (Apeldoorn, 1981: 32-35) , others have argued that it was used for food distribution policies (Chaves et al., 2013) . In either case, there is a possible link between railway construction and conflict intensity. We therefore assign a dummy variable to every province with a train station [railway] . We control for levels of road density [road_density] following a similar reasoning (Mann, 1984 (Mann, , 2008 , using a continuous variable of constructed roads for each province. Additionally, Herbst (2000) argued that higher investments in public infrastructure raises the opportunities for broadcasting state power. Hence, higher road-density levels can also be expected to be associated with quicker interventions by local police forces.
24
21 Finding disaggregated data on ethnic composition is an extremely difficult task, particularly in the context of Africa where migration, refugee flows and general demographic settlement patterns change over time. Therefore, we used numerous sources from varying years to tackle this task (see Table A -2).
The presence of livestock [livestock] may mitigate the effects of scarcity in a particular province, by providing an alternative source of food. In the same vein, more diversified agricultural production, which can be achieved by cultivating cash crops on the side, may also mitigate the impact of climateinduced resource scarcity in a particular province. Hence, we included a dummy variable [Crop_type] to control for this. Finally, it may be that areas with larger populations (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) and rapid demographic transformations (Urdal, 2005) are more prone to political disorder; thus, two continuous variables ([population_density] and [population_growth%] ) are used to control for these effects, respectively. 25 In both instances, a positive correlation is expected.
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the baseline and extended models are reported in the 
Empirical Results
The first set of regressions is reported in Table 2 . The rainfall deviation square is highly statistically significant in all specifications, and confirms a U-shaped association between all four dependent conflict variables and climate shocks. In all the regressions, we included lags of the main explanatory variable in order to test whether climatic shocks in the preceding years (t-1) affect conflict at time t. 27 A statistically significant correlation here would mean that extreme weather variability is not the main trigger of 25 The figures for the population of Nigeria are by all accounts widely inaccurate (Aluko, 1965; Frankema & Jerven, 2013) . The general consensus is that they are huge underestimates, as colonial demographers did not work extensively outside of large towns or settlements and many people were understandably not keen on being counted, and therefore taxed. However, it also appears that the inaccuracies are fairly standard, and thus allow for at least a comparison of the relative populations of the different provinces under review. 26 For a detailed description of all the control variables, their sources and comments, see Tables A-1 and A-2. 27 Second-and third-order lags were used as well; the results did not change in any significant way (not reported).
conflict. However, the estimated coefficients of those lags do not indicate any significance, which supports the argument that climate shocks almost immediately translate into higher levels of conflict.
The control variables behave largely as expected, and their significance levels remain consistent among different econometric specifications. The police variable yields a positive and statistically significant coefficient. Road density yields a negative and significant coefficient. Finally, population growth yields an expected positive and significant sign. -Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1 percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent.
-Second (and latter) lags were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged first differences were used in the levels equation.
-Two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples using Windmeijer (2005) correction.
-Time dummies, province-specific effects and a time trend are included in all regressions. Geographical controls include distance to the coast, distance to the nearest port, and navigable river dummies.
The findings are straightforward, and confirm a direct and causal impact of climatic shocks on conflict.
An example serves to highlight the potential magnitude that one particular climatic shock had on conflict levels. Column 4 of Table 2 Columns 1 through 9 of Table 3 show the results of the baseline regression model, adding various control variables one by one. 29 The results show that the estimated coefficient of rainfall deviation squared remains positive and statistically significant in all specifications, confirming a robust U-shaped climate-conflict relationship (using the Conflict_index_SPC). The agro-ecological zone variable yields the expected positive effect, but is not statistically significant. The railway dummy yields a negative, but insignificant, correlation. Direct taxation yields an expected positive sign, but is statistically insignificant.
The ethnic homogeneity variable yields the expected negative sign, and is significant. Additionally, the dummy for livestock is statistically significant, indicating that there seems to be less conflict in the Northern provinces of Nigeria, where the absence of the Tsetse fly allows for (more) cattle keeping. The significant estimated coefficient of political centralization indicates that in cross-region variation differing political structures suggest considerable explanatory power, and confirms the idea that politically centralized entities are more coherent and less violent.
In column 9 of Table 3 , a binary dummy is included in order to assess whether provinces with cash-crop producers, as compared to subsistence farmers, have experienced different degrees of conflict under similar climatic conditions. The type of crop dummy is statistically insignificant, and therefore is not further interpreted here; however, this distinction is further examined in the next set of regressions.
Finally, in column 10 we have included all of the control variables described above in order to test whether the effect of climatic shocks on conflict disappears via the joint inclusion of these controls. The results did not change in any significant way. Finally, we tested for cross-sectional dependence after each of the above-mentioned set of regressions, as suggested, particularly with reference to GMM estimations, by Conley (1999) and De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) . 30 The reason for this is that there may be a concern that shocks to one province may spill over into adjacent provinces, which could eventually provide inconsistent estimated coefficients. The results suggest that cross-dependence is not a major concern. -Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1 percent; **, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent. Second (and latter) lags were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged first differences were used in the levels equation.
Further explorations
This section will first outline the varying effects climatic shocks have on conflict, conditional on geographical, institutional and economic characteristics; it will then investigate whether the climate-toconflict effect is symmetrical. A large body of literature has emphasized the role of agro-ecological zones (Seo et al., 2008) , pre-colonial structures (Acemoglu et al., 2013; Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013) and crop commercialization (Berry, 1993; Falola, 1987) in shaping and explaining various instances of conflict.
Varying effects
Recent literature has suggested that some agro-ecological zones are less resilient to climatic shocks than others Seo et al., 2008) . This body of literature emphasizes the supply-side of environmental shocks and suggests that the harvests of crops in less resilient regions can more easily be destroyed (Fenske & Kala, 2012) As a result, extreme climatic shocks in these regions are more likely to jeopardize food security, raise resource competition over cropland and pastures, and trigger conflict.
According to Fasona and Omojola (2005) , the Guinean savannah is the most conflict-prone ecological zones in Nigeria. 31 Fasona and Omojola provided ample evidence from the 1971-1980 drought spells in Nigeria, where communal conflict arose between the cattle-keeping Fulanis and the agriculturalists of the Guinean savannah over access to land. The Fulanis and their livestock drifted southward in search of water and food, which resulted in the destruction of the Guinean farmlands and spurred increased communal clashes -a description that does not differ much from similar drought spells during the colonial era (see Section 5.1). Even though there have been permanent tensions between farmers and herders, such issues have been more prevalent during years of higher rainfall deviations (Hussein et al., 1999; Turner, 2004) . Our results support this argument.
Column 1 in Table 4 shows the results of the baseline regression with the inclusion of the AEZ categorical variable. The insignificance of the estimated coefficients of this variable does not confirm an environmental deterministic hypothesis; thus, different agro-ecological zones by themselves cannot explain cross-regional conflict variation. However, when they interact with rainfall deviations from the long-term mean (column 2), differing agro-ecological zones gain more explanatory power, and one of these zones -the Guinean savannah -yields a positive and statistically significant relationship with conflict. The Guinean savannah interaction term also yields the highest estimated coefficient (+0.4491).
In column 3 of Table 4 , the significant estimated coefficient of the political centralization variable suggests that different political structures matter in mediating climate-induced conflict. This finding corroborates with previous literature that sees more politically centralized entities to be more coherent and less violent (North et al., 2009; Osafo-Kwaako & Robinson, 2013) . Furthermore, we include two interaction terms to capture whether different political entities react differently to the occurrence of climatic shocks. It seems that there are more climate-induced conflicts in areas with weak pre-colonial institutions (in this case the eastern provinces), compared to areas with strong pre-colonial institutions (in this case the provinces around the Sokoto Caliphate).
In column 6 of Table 4 , the results show that different types of crops do not account for conflict variation across provinces unless they are affected by a climatic shock. The dummy variable of food crop does not yield a significant correlation. In column 7, however, the estimated coefficients indicate that the provinces in which food crops are cultivated, while being affected by extreme climatic shocks, witnessed higher levels of conflict compared to the cash-crop areas. These results do not confirm the alleged disruptive and calamitous impact of crop commercialization on African farmers, and suggest that in the Nigerian case, the introduction of new cash crops neither destroyed the insurance mechanisms nor intensified the risk of food shortages. On the contrary, it seems that crop commercialization limited the vulnerability to climate shocks because it diversified production and income, which enabled farmers to reap the increasing benefits from inter-regional and international trade. These findings confirm Berry (1975) argument and counter those of Watts (1983) and Vaughan (2007) . It should be noted here that this conclusion does not provide evidence with respect to whether crop commercialization was good or bad for the African farmers in the long run; rather, it argues that the vulnerability of the cash-crop areas was considerably reduced due to agricultural diversification.
Symmetrical effect
The curvilinear (U-shaped) climate-conflict relationship is not fully symmetrical. Although the estimated coefficients in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 are both statistically significant, their coefficients vary considerably. 32 It appears that conflict has been more acute in wetter years (+0.108) than in drier years (+0.064). This result is in line with Theisen (2012) findings for Kenya. A possible explanation for this (perhaps somewhat counterintuitive) finding is that in years of excessive rainfall farmers would lose their entire harvest in a very short time (such as a couple of days), whereas in years of drought farmers could hope and wait for late rains. Therefore, in the former scenario farmers may be more directly concerned with survival and fighting than in a drought scenario, which results in an increase to the conflict timeframe. Another possible explanation may be that excessive rainfall destroys infrastructure, particularly unpaved roads, thereby limiting the ability of colonial police patrols and military escorts to respond quickly to violence. 32 The statistical significance of the effect is slightly lower for positive climatic shocks. This variable is significant at a 10 percent level. Second (and latter) lags were used as instruments in the first-differenced equations, and their once-lagged first differences were used in the levels equation.
-Time dummies, province-specific effects and a time trend are included in all regressions. Geographical controls include distance to the coast, distance to the nearest port, and navigable river dummies. Controls include all variables used in Table 3 
Robustness tests
We performed a number of additional robustness checks on the results presented in Table 5 . First, we reestimated the linkage between rainfall deviation and incidences of conflict using two alternative econometric specifications. The first is a Pooled-OLS with fixed effects, and the second is a probit model.
It should be stated here that the probit model required some modifications to the dataset, and in particular to the dependent variable, as it had to be made binary. Therefore, we constructed three new dependent variables of conflict [Bin_Prisoners, Bin_Homicides and Bin_CourtCases] to estimate the probit model, including both time and fixed-effects, as well as province-specific effect dummies. 33 The main results remained unchanged (Table 5) .
34
Holding all other control variables to their mean, we find that a one standard deviation increase from mean rainfall increases the probability of homicides (that is, more than 25 deaths) by 47.9 percent.
A two standard deviation increase from mean rainfall increases the probability of homicides by 74.3 percent. These percentages confirm this paper's underlying hypothesis that rainfall deviations from the long-term mean increase the probability of violent conflict. The probability remains low when the deviation is moderate (one deviation point), and increases gradually and significantly when the deviation becomes severe (two deviation points).
To avoid any effect driven by outliers, we used a 25-year "rolling window" for panel estimations, and for every regression we added one year observation at the end of the sample and dropped one at the beginning. Rainfall deviation squared passes all of the relevant robustness tests, and is statistically significant in all specifications. Finally, we split our dataset into various categories based on the interaction terms used in the varying effects section, and ran separate regressions on each sub-sample (Brambor et al., 2006) . The results did not change in any significant way (results not reported). 33 The Bin_Homicides variable is set to 0 when less than 25 deaths per year occur, and to 1 otherwise, following relevant literature (Fjelde & von Uexkull, 2012; Hendrix & Salehyan, 2012) .The same modification was followed for Bin_Prisoners and Bin_CourtCases to fit the econometric specifications. 34 We used the "mfx" command in Stata to estimate the marginal effects of climatic shocks on conflict (results not presented). -Corrected t-statistics are shown in brackets. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1 percent;**, 5 percent; and *, 10 percent.
-Geographical controls include distance to the coast, distance to the nearest port, and navigable river dummies. Controls include all variables used in Table 3 .
-Time dummies, province-specific effects and a time trend are included in all regressions.
Qualitative evidence
In this section we back up our regression results with qualitative historical evidence. We use historical newspapers and government reports to explore food shortages, crop-price spikes and outbreaks of violence. We combine and triangulate data from these historical sources in three stages. First, by looking at the rainfall patterns of a particular year and indicating whether moderate and/or severe climatic shocks occurred. For this, we follow the Standardized Precipitation Index 35 classification (Wu et al., 2005) to categorize different-magnitude shocks into three groups: (1) when the deviation is more than ±1, it is considered to be a mild shock; (2) more than ±1.5 indicates a moderate shock; and (3) more than ±2 is seen as an extreme shock (see Tables A -4a, b, c) . Second, we use information from the annual agricultural reports from the colonial government to investigate whether these climatic shocks actually led to deficient harvests and to crop-price spikes. Third, turning to those years and provinces which were severely 35 The Standardized Precipitation Index is based on the probability of recording a given amount of precipitation, where the probabilities are standardized so that an index of zero indicates the median precipitation amount (half of the historical precipitation amounts are below the median, and half are above). As the dry or wet conditions become more severe, the index becomes more negative or positive (Guttman, 1999) . affected, we read through the police, prison and military reports and use the statistics to back up the underlying mechanisms and hypotheses.
For the period 1912-1945, we documented 203 shocks in the whole of colonial Nigeria; 97 of these were owing to excessive rainfall, and 107 were due to mild, moderate or extreme droughts. There were six climatic shocks per year on average. Naturally, these shocks were not evenly spread out. In 1916, 1929 and 1935 there were no shocks of any serious magnitude. In 1913, on the other hand, the situation was disastrous, with extreme droughts extending across large parts of West Africa. It is worth noting that the colonial reports only recorded conflicts of major importance (CO657/17: 67); that is, outbreaks of violence that were a serious concern to the authorities as they potentially threatened the colonial social order. We will now focus on two extreme cases to assess the causal mechanisms tested in this study in greater detail.
The 1913 drought and the 1935 "feast"
A quick look at the rainfall deviation tables (A-4 a, b, c) highlights, on the one hand, the severe drought spells during 1913 which led to a widespread famine, and, on the other hand, the absence of any moderate or severe shock in 1935. At the end of the harvest period the Nigerian Pioneer of September 4, 1913, mentioned: "The absence of rain seems general throughout Nigeria, and is causing some uneasiness.
Should there be no adequate rainfall during the later rains, the ensuing harvest will be of a poor description" -a speculation that became true later that year. In 1913, there were many moderate and severe climatic shocks in several provinces. In Kano, for example, there was an extreme drought (rainfall Turning to the local market conditions for buying food, Table 6 demonstrates the price spike for millet, which rose to an incredible high of 3d per pound (CO657/1: 45). Other grain prices in rural markets exhibited an increase of at least ten times above 1911 levels. The fact that millet prices, and prices of cereals in general, spiked dramatically meant that the vast majority of people were without food, or the means for obtaining it. The urban poor and other low-income groups must have suffered terribly due to food price inflation. Source: CO657/1 Figure 3 shows how rainfall deviation is related to a higher numbers of prisoners and court cases, whereas in "normal" years such levels were not recorded. Kano province was not the only area affected by the drought of 1913. In Bornu province (rainfall deviation: -1.65), a moderate drought also resulted in a severe food crisis. The lack of food supplies induced migration to other provinces -a trend confirmed by the population figures shown in Table 7 . It seems that local inhabitants drifted southward, depopulating Bornu and seeking for more favorable climatic conditions, and relatively better lands to cultivate (see Table 7 ). However, for those who stayed behind, the Chief Commissioner of the native authority prison stated: "there was an increase in the number of prisoners ... this was due mainly to the growth of praedial larceny that last year's food shortage brought about" (CO657/1: 69). Source: CO657/1-4
The Bauchi province faced a moderate climatic shock as well (rainfall deviation: -1.64). The police report The "feast "of 1935
Unlike years of extreme weather fluctuations, there have also been seasons with favorable climatic conditions and exceptionally good yields. 37 The outstanding feature of 1935 was the gradual revival in trade and general prosperity following the great depression, which was accompanied by abundant harvests (CO657/40). Prices of most staple products had recovered, and confidence in the economy had 37 Note the absence of any minor or major climatic shock in Tables A-4a , b, c. One can easily distinguish the three relatively good years as 1916, 1929 and 1935, during been restored. Commercial exports showed an increase of over 30 percent compared to 1934, and exports from both southern and northern Nigeria reached peak levels. Reading through the provincial reports of the year, one can see how local inhabitants, in various provinces, reacted and expressed their satisfaction with the abundance of that year's harvest as a result of well-spread rainfall. 38 The colonial officer of agriculture stated: "since the bulk of the population is agriculturalist the welcome increase in prices paid for farm produce has resulted in a corresponding increase in the amount of money in circulation and in the greater prosperity of the people generally" and added that this was also the case for provinces that had no export crops and were usually poorer (CO657/40: 64). A brief look at the exports of principal cash crops confirms the favorable weather conditions of that year (see Table 8 ). 
Between the extremes
After examining two extreme years, we will now focus on the variation between "moderate" years, and highlight outbreaks of violence following the three-stage approach discussed above. For instance, we will examine the two climatic shocks in Ondo and Ogoja provinces in 1923, a year which, according to the colonial officials "can be overall regarded as being a prosperous one regarding local farmers" (CO 657/9: 12). In Ogoja, the rainfall deviation of +2.14, marked a severe shock. The police report of 1923 stated that "three escorts for major purposes" had been sent to the province during the year, all of whom were accompanied by a high-ranked commissioner of the police. In particular, "in July ... 
Conclusion
This study has investigated the linkage between climatic shocks and the incidence of conflict in colonial Nigeria. It makes several contributions to the current literature. We measured climatic shocks through deviations from long-term rainfall patterns in a nonlinear (U-shaped) relation, capturing both drought and excessive rainfall, and also introduced a new set of continuous conflict variables. We argued that climatic shocks enhanced competition over scarce resources, which led to disputes and clashes on a smaller intercommunal scale; in spite of their calamitous impact on civilian life and property, non-state intercommunal conflicts have received limited attention in the literature to date. The study also dealt with a historical setting that has not yet been subjected to this kind of analysis, and presented a considerable amount of detailed qualitative evidence to add robustness to the econometric results and to obtain a more thorough understanding of the important mechanisms contributing to the outbreak of conflict. This supplementary analysis provided evidence to support the suggested mechanisms leading from climate shocks to conflict in the context of colonial Nigeria. Finally, the study expanded the existing research agenda to historical periods by merging the theoretical and empirical insights of the environmental security and the economic historical literature.
Overall, the results indicate that there exists a robust and significant relationship between rainfall deviations and conflict intensity, which tends to be stronger in agro-ecological zones that are least resilient to climatic variability (such as Guinean savannah), and where (pre-) colonial political structures were less centralized. There is tentative evidence that the relationship is weaker in areas that specialize in the production of export crops (such as cocoa, palm oil and, groundnuts) compared to subsistence farming areas, suggesting that agricultural diversification acted as an insurance mechanism against the whims of nature.
Several long-term implications stem from the results of this study, and need to be further investigated. For instance, future studies could explore the extent to which the introduction of new cash crops (such as cacao) or the expansion of existing cash crops (including palm oil, rubber, and cotton) in Africa destroyed the traditional insurance mechanisms of farmers. The results from this paper seem to suggest that crop commercialization provided the means to increase farmers' income through the additional benefits reaped from international and inter-regional trade, and in turn this diversified farmers' production and limited the vulnerability of the cash-crop areas to the vagaries of climate. However, this is still appears to be prone to debate. Weidmann et al. (2010) variable, which ranges from 0-1; 1 denotes the most homogeneous province, dominated by only one ethnic group. We follow the same classification as these sources and include ethnic groups that account for more than >5 percent of each province's total population.
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Colonial Archives, (Bourn et al., 1994 We obtained detailed information in order to map the economic activity, and then assigned "1" to provinces with cash-crop production and "0" to provinces with solely food-crop production 
